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A REASSESSMENT OF THE
LEGAL BASES OF ZONING
-John E. Donaldson

The legal and conceptual premises underlying the
land use planning and control enabling legislation
contained in most of the state statutory codes in this
country impose serious constraints on the formulation and implementation of effective land use
plans and policie~ The majority of such legislation
is based upon the Standard Zoning Enabling Act,
published by the United States Department of Commerce in 1926, and the Standard City Planning
Enabling Act published by the same agency in 1928.
These models, and the state enactments they
spawned, reflect the trends, attitudes, values and
planning notions of an era that has passed, and
their utility in the field of land use planning is
diminished by the present state of the art.
A well formulated and implemented land use plan
requires a knowledge of what the community is, an
understanding of what it wishes to. become,. an appreciation of the forces which may be present in the
immediate and distant future, and a familiarity with
the range of options and techniques for encouragement and control of development. It requires
the skills of the engineer, attorney, statistician,
demographer, economist and political scientist, as
well as the synthesis and coordination of the
professional planner. It also requires a legal
framework and climate appreciative of its role and
conducive to the realization of its objectives. It is the
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adequacy of this framework and climate which I will
explore.
Just as water can rise no higher than its source,
the limits of the effectiveness of a regulatory system
are defined by ·the range of choices and methods
permitted by its legal foundations. When our system
of employer-employee relations was premised upon
stringent adherence of the principle of "freedom of
contract" and abhorrence of "conspiracies in
restraint of trade", its effectiveness was defined
within a context of prevalence of "yellow dog" contracts and suppression of strikes. Because the system
produced or afforded too great an advantage to the
employer and placed the employee in too weak a
bargaining position, the fundamental legal premises
upon which the system was based had to be
changed. It wasn't that the system was inherently
wrong. It was merely unresponsive to the problems
generated by the industrial revolution.
If the legal and conceptual premises underlying
land use planning and control enabling legislation
unduly limit or fail to afford the range of techniques
and controls required for the formulation and implementation of effective land use policies, they
should be carefully examined and appropriately
modified. I believe the time for examination and
alteration is at hand.
The first sue h premise to be examined is the
assumption that Euclidian zoning is the model to be
formed and implemented in the particular community. The term "Euclidian zoning" is derived from
the case, Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,
272 U. S. 365 (1926), and its notion is expressed in
Section 2 of the Standard Zoning Enableing Act,
which states:
Sec. 2. Districts- For any or oil of said purposes the
local legislative body may divide the municipality into
districts of such number, shape and area as may be
deemed best suited to carry out the purposes of this
oct; and within such districts it may regulate and
restrict the erection.. construction, reconstruction,
alteration, repair, or use of buildings, structures, or
land. All such regulations shall be uniform for each
class or kind of building throughout each district, but

the regulations in one district may diller from those in
other districts.

On the assumption that qualitatively different land
uses are incompatible, Euclidian zoning defines a
well planned community in terms of a mop whereon
is drawn geometric patterns or districts to which
qualitatively similar land use authorizations ore
assigned with the effect of separating "higher uses"
from "lower uses". Thus, in a typical case, single
family dwelling districts utilizing Iorge lots ore
isolated from the intrusion of dwellings on smaller
lots which ore separately districted. Both ore protected from the intrusion of higher density residential
land uses, and these, as the ever expanding protected class, are protected from the respective intrusions of commercial, light industrial, and heavy
industrial uses. Further within each of the districts
employed, regulations ore uniform as to like
buildings permitted therein.
Euclidian zoning, in short, emphasizes the mutual
repugnance of qualitatively different land uses and
invites classification and districting along economic,
aesthetic and functional lines with little regard to the
interdependence of the activities permitted within the
dynamic urban system. The Euclidian system, emphasizing the isolation of commercial and industrial
activities and encouraging the segregation of
"higher" residential uses from "lower" or more intense residential uses, is a major contributor to the
problem of urban sprawl and to the boring symmetry of housing developments laid out in ticky-toc
patterns characterized by block after block of
houses on 12,000 square ft. lots set back 35 ft. from
the road, having side yards of 20 ft. and each
costing $23,000. That the separation of "higher"
residential uses from "lower" residential uses contributes to racial segregation of housing within a
given community is self-evident.

The orientation of enabling legislation to the
model of Euclidian zoning has caused the development of a number of doctrines inimical to the formulation and implementation of effective land use
policies, chief among which ore the following:
1. Uniformity of regulations pertaining to lot size,
set-bock, side yards, etc. as they relate to similar
structures is essential. Development is to occur in accordance with a preconceived, static objective and a
readily measurable spatial standard .of what is
tolerable for particular kinds of structures. Variances
from the standard ore not to be permitted merely
because the variance is compatible; a variance is to
be allowed only if there is undue hardship in compliance.
2. Non-conforming uses by definition ore bad,
should not be enlarged, and should either be encouraged to decoy or to be removed. That a particular non-conforming use may be compatible, or
may afford some desirable service or amenity is offorded little weight.
3. The introduction into a district of a dissimilar
use either by special use permit or amendment to the
zoning mop contravenes the "ideal" of "symmetry
of the some" and constitutes illegal "spot zoning",
which in a number of states is presumed when symmetry is compromised.
.
Although Euclidian zoning is the model envisioned
in enabling legislation, it is not the ideal of increasing numbers of professional planners and
students of urban order. More and more modern
land-use-planning thought asserts that the key to
harmonious, functional, and responsive urban and
suburban environments is planning that emphasizes
the unity of the community, the interrelationship of
qualitatively different land uses, and the need for
imaginative and creative design and arrangement of
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structures. The well planned community, under this
approach, is not necessarily one in which like uses
ore first aggregated and then separated from dif·
ferent uses, but is instead one in which the uses per·
mitted are so arranged and ordered that the
dynamics of the urban system con function at the
highest level consistent with the public welfare. The
key to effectiveness under this approach is not sym·
metry and division, but performance and unity.
Utilizing this key, it may well be possible for the
planner, who sees the urban system as a dynamic in·
terreloted process fed by change rather than as a
static order, to envision a workable, non-Euclidian
plan for a particular community. He may develop a
practical design for a partially developed area
predicated upon uniqueness, not uniformity, in which
"non-conforming uses" may be enlarged and blended into the whole, and in which additional uses of
a qualitatively different nature which afford needed
amenities aesthetically compatible. But the legal
climate in which most planners must function, heated
by a Euclidian sun and mode humid by uniformity, is
too stifling for this kind of productive endeavor.
A number of studies have concluded that Euclidian
zoning, with its static concepts, just does not work in
areas where development pressures are strong. Increasingly, development occurs not under zoning,
but by amendments to zoning ordinances and maps.
Non·Euclidion planners-zoners, recogn1z1ng the
need for flexible response capability in implementation oordinances in recent years, have in·
traduced the concepts of "planned unit development", "residential planned communities", the
listing of multitudes of uses permitted only by administrative discretion governed by a standard such
as "hold zoning" "contract zoning", the "floating
zone", and "performance zoning". While these
more flexible implementation techniques afford advantages lacking in a purely Euclidian approach,
they are, in the minds of many, incompatible with

the assumption that zoning should be in accordance
with a comprehensive plan with mop appended.
Although judicial acceptance of these techniques is
increasing, it remains nonetheless true that their
legal underpinnings are insecure.
In summary on the point, I do not suggest that the
Euclidian be outlawed, only that the non-Euclidion
be more effectively accommodated by the legal
system. This can be occomplish·ed by eliminating
from zoning enabling legislation requirements that
regulations be uniform and expressly authorizing the
use of performance standards and flexible
techniques to guide, encourage and control land
development and use.
The second premise underlying current land use
planning enabling legislation is that the formulation
and implementation of land use policies belongs entirely at the local level of government. With few exceptions, states have delegated the police power
over land use to the localities without retaining or
reserving power or procedural tools to protect the
state interest from adverse local planning and implementation activity. Just as local planning and im·
plementation proceeds from an awareness that the
common weal con be served by subjecting individual
tracts to Ia nd use controls, it would seem that state
planning would assume that the interests of the state
as a whole may require the developmental patterns
of localities to be subjected to state influence and in·
volvement. In England and several European countries, local planning is required to serve not only
local needs, but broader needs as well. This is not
so in the United States, with the possible emerging
exceptions of Vermont, California and Florida.
Does a state need a ready capability to direct, influence and control local planning activity and the
development undertaken pursuant thereto? Several
examples, which I hope will constitute a sufficient
answer, follow:

1. When all of the suitable form and grazing land
in a state is already put to agricultural uses, and the
state's population is rapidly expanding, can it wisely
permit to localities the determination of whether
such land is to remain as part of the agricultural
economy or be developed into subdivisions?
2. When a substantial segment of a state's
population can afford housing no better than mobile
homes, can a state wisely leave to localities the
determination of whether mobile home parks are a
permitted use in a community?
3. When there is a substantial unemployment in a
region of the state that could be significantly
ameliorated by the location of a prospective major
industry in a particular locality, can the state wisely
leave to the locality the determination of whether or
not the industry is welcome?
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4. In a region of the stale where water resources
for human consumption and industrial use are
scarce, may the slate wisely permit individual
localities, through their land use plans, to determine
the allocation which actual development under such
plans will assure?
The list could be expanded. The point is that local
land use plans reflect local values and perceptions
of self-interest and may not reflect the broader
needs of the slate and region.
In a number of slates a beginning awareness of
the state interest in local land use practices is
evident, as witnessed by the various wetlands
statutes, coastal plains land use control codes, and,
in Virginia, the undertaking of studies to identify
"area of critical environmental concern". What is
needed, however, is a candid acknowledgement to
the effect that on a broader scale, land use practices
in the localities are of sufficient potential
significance to the general welfare of the state as to
justify direct state involvement at the local level of
planning and implementation.
Such involvement could take a number of forms,
one of which might be expressly affording the state
standing to enjoin developmental activity believed to
be injurious to slate or regional interests. The
proposed oil refinery and industrial complex
proposed for Nansemond, Virginia, of concern to
the people of Norfolk, Newport News, Virginia
Beach and Portsmouth, is an example of a situation
to which a stale response would probably be appropriate. Other approaches could involve req11iring
local land use plans and implementation ordinances
to be submitted to an appropriate slate agency for
review and comment before adoption and amendment, requiring that they be in conformity with a
slate-wide land use plan, which would in effect be
implemented through control and coordination of
local plans.
In the context of this problem, one must keep in
mind that any question involving relationships between the state and its loco I ities, or their respective
areas of jurisdiction, is essentially a political
question which must find its resolution in the
political arena. When the issue is>state control over
land use, the political question is highly controversial. if not explosive. Nonetheless, it needs to
be resolved in the interest of the whole, not the
parts.
The third principle which I would question is the
principle that land is the target towards which land
use planning enabling legislation is aimed, and that
as a consequence, traditional concepts of property
rights, real property rights, limit the regulation and
control of land uses. The emphasis on land has
clouded the vision of the public, the courts, and the
practioners in the planning field with unnecessary
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distortion and impairment. I submit that the true subject of regulation in land use planning and implementation is not land, but activity, and that a
zone whlch permits a specific land use is, in reality,
conferring s license to engage in that activity. If the
orientation of the legal basis of land use planning
related to the issue of the reasonableness of the
licensing requirements and procedures applicable to
the acitvilies beinng regulated, rather than to the
reasonableness of the "land controls", the air would
be clearer and planning could occur in a better
legal climate, with the requirement of
"reasonableness" still being maintained. In substance, I believe land use planning to be primarily a
process which attempts to allocate and coordinate,
within a spatial context, the activities that are to be
carried on in the community, and to promote
physical harmony by the imposition of design
criteria related to height, bulk, and open space.
land is entirely secondary. It is activity with which
the planner and the community ore primarily concerned.
Two statements illustrate the point I wish to make.
Both statements ore credible and have a wide
following. The first is: A. man ahould not be
deprived of hia property without compenaatiorL The
second is: A. contemplated activity genuinely and

materially affecti"'f the public intereat ia a proper
aubject of regulatiorL Suppose that the legal issue is
whether the developer of a proposed shopping center adjacent to a major artery can be legally
required to construct and maintain a parallel artery
to accommodate the traffic problem which his
development would create. The Courts are divided in
their response to the issue, some regarding the
question as essentially a property matter, to be
resolved in the context of traditional notions of
property rights, while others recognize the question
as essentially one in which the issue is the
reasonableness of a condition attached to the licensing of on activity. I subscribe to the latter view, and
believe that government may properly regard
development as an activity, which, in a spatial as
well as a broader context, can be subjected to
reasonable licensing requirements.
In summary and conclusion, I believe that the fundamental legal underpinnings of state land use planning enabling legislation require examination and
modification if land use planning and implementation is to be effective. The shortcomings of
the Euclidian concept, the negligence of state noninvolvement, and the limitations of, the misplaced
emphasis on land, as opposed to activity, as the
critical subject of concern must be remedied. Attention to these problems has not been locking.
Responsible critiques and suggestions for improvement of the state of the art and practice of

land use planning and control techniques abound in
current literature in the field. Perhaps the most
noteworthy attock on the inadequacy of state
enabling legislation is the undertaking of the
American low Institute to develop a model oct,
which in tentative draft is known as "A Model Lond
Development Code". The project, begun in 1963,
may produce a final draft in 1974. Although the
language of the tentative draft is just that, tentative,
I would note that the draft abandons Euclidian terminology, recognizes a brooder state role in the formulation and implementation of local land use
plans, and regards developmental activity, rather
than land as the subject of planning and implementation. Among other things, the draft seeks to
improve administration, authorizes localities to offer
development incentives, permits condemnation for
purposes of encouraging development, expressly
authorizes the imposition of land dedication
requirements and of fees to defray public expenses
that may need to be incurred in response to development, and provides a system for making public land
use decisions affecting individual parcels public
records that may readily be examined in a "title"
search. The Code, when adopted and published in
final form by the American Low Institute, is certain
to hove a major impact on the reformation of
enabling legislation across the county-certainly a
delightful prospect. §
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extensive and probably the most successful effort.
The Notional Trust and other societies ore working
to catalogue important structures so they won't be
demolished. New York City has on innovative
program which lists landmarks and prohibits their
destruction or changes without prior approval. This
has been suggested to be on unjustified interference
with property rights. An alternative could be the purchose of negative easements against the destruction
of historic areas. Robert L Montague II I in on article at 51 Vo. L Rev. 1214 ( 1965) suggests a system
of tax incentives to be used in Virginia for the
preservation of its many antiquities. Even with these
efforts to catalogue and preserve, the loss of important landmarks continues. Under a program
inaugurated in the 1930's the Historic American
Buildings Survey listed more than 10,000 buildings
worthy of preservation. It was estimated in 1963
that 50% of these buildings, significant in America's
history and culture hod already been destroyed.
Another unfortunate development is demonstrated
by Seagram & SoiUI n T~U Commu•ion, 200
N.E.2d 447 (1964). The Seagram building in New
York City hod been built with unusual core and the
result was a beautiful structure that promoted the
economic interests of the owner and enhanced the
beauty of the city. The Tax Commission chose to
adopt a different appraisal system which increased
the owners tax bill. This was on obviously selfdefeating and short-sighted action, but it was offirmed.

CONCLUSION

The most attractive method for enhancing the appearance of our communities is the adoption of architectural boards of review. These hove been rejected in several cases, but the time is ripe for their acceptance. Whatever the method adopted, aesthetic
control is a vital field and one worth the efforts of
the legal profession. The wealth and know-how are
available. The question remains whether the courts
and the legislatures will provide the legal framework
for protecting the beauty of our communities. The
alternative is for our generation to be remember~ci
only as the innovators of "shopping center row."
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